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Abstract 
Our research examines the effect of combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan on casualties. 
We use restricted data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Social Security 
Administration (SSA) to construct a panel of all U.S. Active Duty service members having served 
at some point during the years 2001-2012. Casualties disproportionately occur at higher rates 
among (i) young, white, males (ii) enlisted personnel (iii) less educated personnel (iv) and those 
in combat job types. Our estimates indicate that overall U.S. military personnel who deployed in 
an individual year to Iraq or Afghanistan had a 48 per 100,000 higher probability of death than 
non-deployed military personnel who remained stateside. The increased fatal injury risk of 
deployed U.S. military personnel is 15 times higher than the national average civilian workplace 
fatality rate, but roughly equal to the fatal injury risk faced in some of the most dangerous civilian 
occupations. Our estimates suggest a compensating wage differential equal to $808 per month 
would be appropriate, in comparison to the current status quo of $225 per month in danger pay 
(and additional tax benefits) provided to U.S. military personnel deployed into combat zones. 
The additional compensation should also be adjusted by service or job type. 
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authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 
Government. Special thanks to Dhruv Khurana for excellent graphical assistance, to Sarah 
Burns, Jesse Cunha, David Henderson, Stan Horowitz, Mark Zais, and seminar participants at 
the Western Economic Association International conference (defense sessions), Naval 
Postgraduate School seminar series, and Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis conference for 
helpful comments.




The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced the highest number of casualties for 
 
U.S. military personnel since the Vietnam War. As of May 2018, the total number of combined 
 
U.S. military deaths for these two major conflicts was 6,808, with additional wounded personnel 
numbers coming in at over 50,000 (U.S. DOD, 2018). While casualties and the total number of 
personnel serving in theater have declined in each of the conflicts (in comparison to their peak 
totals), there continues to be fierce fighting in isolated regions. The most recent Department of 
Defense documents show a total of 5,262 U.S. military personnel in Iraq and 9,800 in 
Afghanistan (U.S. CRS, 2017), with changes being made periodically to account for the 
fluctuating combat environment (Michaels, 2017). Our research examines the nature of U.S. 
military combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and their effect on casualties with an eye 
toward the efficient and equitable ex ante compensation for deployment based fatality risk.  
 We use  restricted U.S. military personnel records from the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) and Social Security Administration (SSA) for the years 2001-2012 as our 
principal data sources. The data reveal how the casualty figures in Afghanistan and Iraq 
distribute across gender, race, education, age, rank, marital status, job type, and service. Our 
empirical strategy uses stateside service members as a control group in comparison to the 
treatment group of deployed Active Duty service members to Iraq or Afghanistan in a natural 
experiment type setting to tease out the effects of combat deployments on casualties. Finally, 
we examine the appropriate level of danger pay for deployed military personnel. 
We contribute to a growing body of literature  that has examined the effects of combat 
deployments on a number of medium-term and long-term outcomes including violence, health, 
family structure, and education (Armey and Lipow 2016, Cunha et al. 2017, Cesur et al. 2013, 
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Cesur and Sabia 2016, Engel et al. 2010, Lyle 2006, Negrusa et al. 2014, and Shen et al. 2016). 
Consistent with the previous literature, we use the exogeneity of combat deployments to 
estimate the effect of combat deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan on casualty rates (See Lyle 
2006 for elaboration). 
Our preferred estimates indicate that overall, U.S. military personnel who deploy in an 
individual year to Iraq or Afghanistan observe a 48 per 100,000 increase in the probability of 
death in comparison to non-deployed military personnel who stay stateside. That said, this 
overall value masks significant differences across different personnel types. We show that 
casualties disproportionately occur at higher rates among (i) young, white, males (ii) enlisted 
personnel (iii) less educated personnel (iv) and those in combat job types. Our estimates 
suggest a compensating wage differential equal to $808 per month would be appropriate in 
comparison to the current $225 per month in danger pay (and additional tax benefits) provided 
to U.S. military personnel deployed into combat zones. Furthermore, extra compensation for 
fatality risk should be adjusted by service or job type. 
2. Institutional Details 
 There are two key institutional details crucial to our research that we present now prior 
to our econometric results. First, we document the quantitative importance of military 
causalities overall and their distribution among demographic characteristics and military 
occupation. Second, because our interest lies equally in the economically most justifiable ex 
ante compensation for increased death risk when deployed we explain the current additional 
monetary compensation for combat deployment in the military. 
2.1 Overview of Deployments and Casualties in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars 
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are two of the longest foreign wars in the history of 
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the United States. In terms of specific rankings, the war in Afghanistan (roughly 17 years as of 
2018) is regarded as the longest of all time, while Iraq ranks as #3 overall in terms of official 
length (Taylor 2014). The war in Afghanistan began in response to the September 11, 2001, 
attacks on New York and Washington. Subsequently the U.S. worked with local elements on 
the ground to root out elements of Al Qaeda in the region and support a friendlier government 
toward U.S. interests. As a pretext to this the U.S. required the replacement of the Taliban 
government, which was previously in power in 2001. Although many of the previous 
leadership entities of the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Osama Bin Laden and Khalid Sheik 
Mohammad) have been captured or killed, the U.S. and its allies still frequently battle forces in 
the region (Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants). 
U.S. troop totals have varied substantially over the years in Afghanistan, starting with 
4,100 personnel at the beginning of the war and gradually increasing to 35,600 in 2008 (Figure 
1 below; U.S. Congressional Research Service 2014). In 2008 the U.S. started to dramatically 
increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, reaching a peak of 99,800 in 2011. Subsequent 
troop levels have declined substantially with current U.S. personnel totals tallied around 
10,000.  
As for casualties, death totals in Afghanistan were relatively low by historical standards 
at the early onset of the war with U.S. service member deaths under 200 per year up until 
2008. The increase in troop totals and combat operations led to an increase in the number of 
deaths per year shortly thereafter, reaching a peak of 499 U.S. service member deaths in 2010. 
Total number of deaths have declined since peak operations and the total number of U.S. 
deaths was 15 in 2017 in Afghanistan (Icasualties.org 2018a). 
Roughly 1-2 years after the war in Afghanistan started the U.S. made a push to remove 
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Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. The war in Iraq officially began in March, 2003. By 
April 2003 Baghdad had fallen and the U.S. and its allies helped set up a new democratic 
government. U.S. troop totals were substantially higher in comparison to Afghanistan at the 
beginning of the Iraq War with U.S. troop totals starting out with around 150,000 service 
members.  
Troop totals stayed at roughly the 150,000 level with the exception of some variations 
such as the surge until 2009 when the Obama administration slowly started drawing down 
personnel numbers until the official end of the war. Although the Iraq War officially ended in 
2012, U.S. military personnel still have boots on the ground to help support the Iraqi 
government and their fight against opposition forces (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). 
Current U.S. troop totals in Iraq are around 5,000. 
Total U.S. personnel deaths in Iraq hovered at 800-900 per year for the years 2004 
through 2008. The highest number of deaths occurred in 2007 with a total of 904 U.S. deaths 
for that year. Total U.S. deaths declined dramatically after 2009 until the official end of the 
war in 2012. Given the U.S. still has troops in Iraq as of May 2018, there are still periodic 
deaths although relatively small in number. In 2017, there were a total of 17 U.S. deaths in 
Iraq (Icasualties.org 2018b). 
2.2 Additional Monetary Compensation for Combat Deployment 
There are several monetary supplements for U.S. military personnel who are deployed 
into combat zones. Military personnel who are deployed into combat zones are entitled to 
Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger pay (HFP/IDP) – or more commonly known as simply 
danger pay. There are established pay guidelines for military personnel eligible for HFP/IDP 
(Department of Defense 2017a). The guidelines state: 
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“HFP/IDP is payable at the monthly rate of $225.00. Service members will receive 
$7.50 for each day they are on duty in an IDP area up to the maximum monthly rate of 
$225. Members who are exposed to a hostile fire or hostile mine explosion event are 
eligible to receive non-prorated Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) in the full monthly amount of 
$225. Members cannot receive both IDP and HFP in the same month.” 
 
HFP/IDP is often confused with Hardship Duty Pay-Location (HDP-L). HDP-L is different 
from HFP/IDP in that it can be received by personnel in non-combat areas. The Department of 
Defense (2017b) guidelines for HDP-L are that:  
“HDP-L is compensation paid to members assigned outside the continental United 
States in Quality of Life (QoL) Hardship locations -- Locations where QoL living 
conditions are substantially below the standard most members in the continental United 
States would generally experience. HDP-L is intended to recognize the extraordinary 
arduous living conditions, excessive physical hardship, and/or unhealthful conditions 
that exist in a location or assignment. Rates are payable in increments of $50, $100, or 
$150 a month based on the level of QoL hardship in a given area.” 
 
HDP-L is currently set at $100 per month if a military member is stationed in Iraq or 
Afghanistan (Military.com 2016). The compensation is received in addition to HFP/IDP. 
U.S. military personnel deployed into combat zones also receive special tax exemptions, 
known formally as the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE), as the result of current Internal 
Revenue Service guidelines (IRS 2017). The IRS details six specific income tax exclusions (at 
both the federal and state levels) related to the CZTE: (i) Basic pay for every month the 
military member is present in a combat zone, (ii) reenlistment bonuses, (iii) school loan 
repayments, (iv) HFP/IDP, (v) discharge benefits, and (vi) awards and other financial 
incentives – personnel can exclude associated income for submissions made while in a combat 
zone. Notably, military pay earned while in a combat zone is still subject to Social Security 
and Medicare taxes. Enlisted and Warrant Officers are allowed to exclude all military pay for 
each month present in a combat zone. In contrast, Commissioned Officers are limited to the 
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highest rate of enlisted pay plus HFP/IDP for each month present in a combat zone.  
The previous literature has found that the CZTE is the largest additional monetary 
benefit military personnel receive while deployed into combat zones (Pleeter et al. 2011). 
HFP/IDP cost the Department of Defense $789 million in 2009 while the cost to the Treasury 
for CZTE was $3.6 billion – approximately 4.5 times the cost of HFP/IDP. The average value 
of the CZTE for deployed service members was $5,990 in 2009. All the pay supplements can 
substantially alter the take home pay for service members deployed into combat zones. 
3. Data Details 
We combine Social Security Administration (SSA) and Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) data to construct a panel of all Active Duty military personnel stationed in 
the United States and deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for the years 2001-2012. The SSA 
data provide the date of death for all service members who died during the sample time 
period regardless of whether it was in theater or otherwise. The individual level DMDC data 
provide information on the general characteristics for each service member.1 
The variables in the DMDC information include annual data, measured each 
September, on age, gender, military branch, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), rank, 
marital status, number of dependents, education, race, and Armed Forces Qualification Test 
score. 2 We breakdown the MOS variable into four subcategory job types including Service, 
Combat, Support, and “Other” Job. We also use DMDC data on unit identifier code (UIC) at 
the battalion level to cluster standard errors and include battalion fixed effects in some of the 
models. 
																																								 																				
1 The data do not include information on non-Active Duty military such as National Guard or Reserve members. 
 
2 The AFQT is a subtest of the larger Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and is formed from a 
composite score of four general areas: arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and 
mathematics knowledge. 
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DMDC deployment records identify whether an individual was deployed in any given 
year. The data identify the country of deployment and in our primary analysis we use it to 
construct a dummy variable for an individual being deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan in any 
year.3 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. In our sample, about 17,000 service members 
died during 2001-2012; 6,267 were attributable to combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. Figures 2 
and 3 break down U.S. active duty member deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan during 2001-
2012. Deaths are not proportional to distribution in the sample.  
Although Blacks make-up about 20% of our sample, they only represent about 10% 
of theater deaths. Women represent 15% of the sample, and they make up 2% of the theater 
deaths. Deaths are also skewed towards enlisted, younger, and less educated military 
personnel. Officers are 16% of our sample, but only 10% of theater deaths, those with high 
school or less are 74% of the sample and represent 84% of theater deaths, and the average age 
of death is 26, while the average age in the sample is about 29. Turning to Figure 3, 
unsurprisingly, 55% of those killed in theater in Iraq and Afghanistan were in combat 
positions, despite being only 11% of the sample. Finally, about 70% of combat deaths were 
incurred by the Army, and 23% were incurred by the Marines.4 
																																								 																				
3 The deployment data from DMDC appears to be subject to some measurement error. For example, the deployment 
data state that more military have been deployed to Kuwait than Iraq. However, if a service member was coded as 
simultaneously in Kuwait and Iraq, we code them as having been deployed to Iraq, and if someone is coded as 
being in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan simultaneously we code them as being deployed to Afghanistan. 
	
4 Unfortunately the available data on injuries are somewhat incomplete. We were only able to obtain information on 
combat injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan. We were not able to obtain information on stateside injuries and were 
therefore not able to accurately estimate the effect of deployment on injuries. An obvious extension to this study 
would be to analyze the effect on injuries when such data become available.	In terms of raw comparisons, the data in 
Table 1 show military personnel are about six times more likely to obtain a combat injury in comparison to a combat 
fatality. 
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4. Empirical Method 
 
The literature on combat deployments (Armey and Lipow 2016, Cunha et al. 2017, Cesur 
et al. 2013, Cesur and Sabia 2016, Engel et al. 2010, Lyle 2006, Negrusa et al. 2014, and Shen 
et al. 2016) has used a variety of techniques including comparing (1) deployed service members 
with those stateside, (2) combat deployments versus non-combat deployments, (3) civilians 
versus combat deployments, and (4) active duty versus non-active duty deployments to estimate 
the effects of combat deployments on economic and social outcomes. Here we use an estimation 
strategy that is the most relevant for the purposes of our research – comparing fatalities of 
stateside U.S. service members with those deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. 
4.1 Regression Model 
To identify the effect of deployment into combat zones on fatality rates for Active Duty 
U.S. service members, we use the regression model 
𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝑋!"! 𝜃 + 𝜀!" 
where Fatalityit takes a value of one if service member i dies in year t and zero otherwise. The 
binary indicator variable Deploymentit is equal to one if service member i is deployed to either 
Iraq or Afghanistan in year t and zero if stationed in the U.S. for the entire year. The vector 
𝑋! is a set of individual control variables including age, gender, job type, rank, marital status, 
number of dependents, education, race, ethnicity, score on the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude test (AFQT) battalion fixed effects, time fixed effects, and ε, which is an 
idiosyncratic error term. Here β is the coefficient of interest and can be interpreted as the 
effect of being deployed into a combat zone on death. 
4.2 Limitations 
 The assumption that individual level deployments are random (which is required for 
obtaining unbiased estimates) is generally accepted in the literature. While discussed in a 
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number of articles, Lyle (2006, page 323) provides a specific rationale for why individual-level 
deployments are essentially randomized in the military:  
“The army’s Human Resources Command assigns soldiers to division-level units 
every 2–4 years based on the “needs of the army.” This army-specific term captures 
the essence of all assignments: world events drive army assignments. While soldiers 
may indicate a preference for a particular division, the timing of the move and the 
assignment of a soldier to a subordinate army unit are largely independent of a 
soldier’s preferences. 
 
  Lyle (2006) and other similar studies argue that self-selection into deployments by 
individual military personnel is incredibly difficult and that these deployments may be 
considered exogenous by researchers. Therefore, comparisons of deployed versus non-deployed 
service members is a plausible identification strategy as long as researchers include the 
appropriate control variables in their regressions. 
 Although the exogeneity of individual deployments is generally considered a sound 
identification strategy in the literature, recent work shows how some studies may have biases 
present if the appropriate controls are not included in the regressions (Armey et al. 2017). For 
example, race and family formation often play a factor in deployment status – specifically, they 
find that African Americans or those who were married and had children were far less likely 
than other service members to have been deployed to serve in combat zones.  
Furthermore, it may also be the case that healthy service members are more likely to 
deploy than unhealthy military personnel because personnel with a medical concern are red 
flagged and not allowed to deploy. Although we have data on standard variables such as race 
and marital status, which we include in the regressions, we do not have information on the 
medical records of personnel so we cannot control for medical concerns. Finally, it may also be 
the case that some military personnel fake injuries or intentionally become pregnant to get out 
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of combat deployments. Because such combat avoidance actions are incredibly difficult to 
obtain data on they are omitted from our regressions; we are unaware of any recently published 
articles on any combat avoidance actions in the deployment literature. 
5. Regression Results 
 Table 2 presents our regressions comparing all stateside U.S. active duty personnel with 
those deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. All four columns show positive coefficients; the point 
estimates indicate that, compared to remaining stateside, deployment in a given year into Iraq or 
Afghanistan leads to an increase in the probability of death for individual service members. The 
coefficients range between 0.0004763 and 0.0009649, so that military members deployed to Iraq 
or Afghanistan face between about a 48 per 100,000 and a 96 per 100,000 higher risk of death in 
a year compared to equivalent non- deployed stateside military personnel. All four coefficients 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our preferred estimates are in column 4, which are 
from the regression including all personal characteristics controls plus unit and time fixed 
effects. The estimates from column 4 suggests that overall, military personnel who deployed in 
an individual year to Iraq or Afghanistan had about a 48 per 100,000 increase in the probability of 
death compared to non-deployed military personnel who remained stateside. 
 Table 3 presents results broken down by service type (Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Marines). The Army results in columns 1-4 show positive coefficients in all four of the 
specifications and range in value from 0.000657 to 0.00106. In addition, all four of the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Out of all four services military personnel 
serving in the Army had the highest increase in the probability of death when being deployed to 
Iraq or Afghanistan. Our preferred estimates from column 4 indicate that Army soldiers who 
deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan have about a 66 per 100,000 increase in the probability of death in 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237059 
11 	
comparison to non-deployed Army personnel who stayed stateside. In contrast, the Air Force 
results show a very different story for deployed service members. Columns 5-8 have coefficients 
ranging in value between -0.0000743 and 0.000193 with none of the coefficients statistically 
significant at any of the conventional levels. Air Force personnel saw little to no difference in 
fatality rates when deployed into Iraq or Afghanistan in comparison to staying stateside. 
 The Navy results in Table 3 show a positive relationship with deployment and fatality 
rates. The coefficients in columns 9-12 range in value from 0.0003157 to 0.000414. The 
coefficients in columns 9 and 10 are statistically significant at the 1% level and those in columns 
11 and 12 are statistically significant at the 5% level. The Marine results also show a positive 
effect on death for being deployed into Iraq or Afghanistan. The coefficients range in value 
between 0.00036 and 0.00084, and all four coefficients in columns 13-16 are statistically 
significant at either the 1% or 5% levels. Based on our preferred specification, which includes 
control variables and unit and time fixed effects, Navy personnel deployed into Iraq or 
Afghanistan faced about a 37 per 100,000 higher chance of death than if they had remained 
stateside and Marines deployed into Iraq or Afghanistan faced about a 36 per 100,000 higher 
chance of death than if they had remained stateside. 
 Table 4 displays results broken down by job type (Combat, Support, Service, and Other). 
The most prominent results are those in columns 1-4, which indicate that combat personnel saw a 
dramatic increase in the probability of death, between 179 per 100,000 and 234 per 100,000 in 
comparison to their stateside counterparts. All four of the coefficients in columns 1-4 are 
significant at the 1% level. Our preferred estimates from column 4 show that combat personnel 
who deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan observed a 180 per 100,000 increase in the probability of death 
in comparison to non-deployed combat personnel who stayed stateside. The Support Job type 
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results in columns 5-8 also show a positive relationship with deployment status and fatality rates. 
All four of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and range in value between 
0.00028 and 0.00069. The estimates from our preferred specification indicate Support personnel 
face a 30 per 100,000 higher probability of death than equivalent non-deployed Support 
personnel. 
The rest of the job types (Service and Other job types) in Table 4 show coefficients often 
changing from negative to positive (or vice versa) depending upon the specification used. In 
addition, the rest of the job type results appear to be imprecise in comparison to the Combat and 
Service Job type results when looking at their levels of statistical significance, particularly those 
including time and unit fixed effects. There appears to be little or no evidence of a positive effect 
of deployment on fatalities when focusing on the Service or Other job types.  
6. Implications for Military Pay Policy 
 Our preferred estimates of the effect of deployments on fatalities from the pooled data 
(column 4 in Table 2) indicate that military personnel who deployed in an individual year to Iraq 
or Afghanistan had about a 48 per 100,000 increase in the likelihood of death in comparison to 
non-deployed military personnel who stayed stateside. To understand how this compares to death 
rates in the civilian world, we now present information from the National Safety Council (2015) 
and the U.S. Department of Labor (2012). 
6.1 Military Fatality Risks Versus in Civilian Employment  
Figure 4 shows the rates of unintentional-injury-related deaths in the U.S. per 100,000 
population during 2001-2012. Over the 12 years fatalities occurring at home steadily rose, while 
motor vehicle fatalities fell. Non-motor vehicle fatalities in public and work-related fatalities 
essentially remained constant. By 2012 the rate of accidental deaths in the home was about 20 per 
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100,000 population; deaths in motor vehicle accidents was about 12 per 100,000 population; 
deaths in public unrelated to motor vehicle accidents was 8 per 100,000 population; and deaths at 
work was about 1 per 100,000 population. The total rate of unintentional-injury-related deaths in 
the U.S. in 2012 was about 40 per 100,000 population. If the average person in the military 
stationed in the U.S. faced roughly the same risk of an accidental death as the typical civilian, 
then deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan more than doubled the chance of an injury-related death. 
For combat personnel, the increase in the chance of death from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan 
is more than four times the average rate of unintentional-injury-related deaths among U.S. 
civilians. 
 The data in Figure 4 do not adjust fatality rates for the time exposed to risk. Each rate is 
the number of fatalities per 100,000 population. The risk of a fatal motor vehicle accident rises as 
the time spent in a car rises and work-related deaths per 100,000 population does not account for 
non-workers, part-time workers, or seasonal workers. Figure 5 examines the rate of workplace 
fatalities for high-risk occupations in 2012 using data from the Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries (CFOI). The Bureau of Labor Statistics generates the information contained in the CFOI 
by examining death certificates, medical examiner reports, OSHA reports, and workers’ 
compensation records to determine those deaths that are work-related. The rates are expressed 
relative to 100,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) workers; total work hours divided by 2,000 (40 
hours per work day × 5 days per week × 50 weeks per year). The rates represent the average 
incremental increase in the chance of death from working in each high-risk profession, and so 
represent a natural comparison to the incremental increase in the chance of death from 
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. 
 In 2012, the average rate of work-related deaths in the U.S. across all occupations was 
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about 3 per 100,000 FTE workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013). Based on our preferred 
specification, the incremental risk of dying due to deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan for all 
military personnel was 15 times higher than the chance of dying in the average civilian job and 
for combat personnel 56 times higher than the chance of dying in the average civilian job.5 The 
two highest risk occupations in Figure 5 are logging workers and fishers and related fishing 
workers with fatality rates of about 128 per 100,000 FTE workers and 117 per 100,000 FTE 
workers. The remaining eight high-risk occupations have fatality rates ranging from about 53 per 
100,000 FTE workers to 17 per 100,000 FTE workers. Except for the two highest risk 
occupations the increase in fatal injury risk from deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan is 1-2 times 
higher than the incremental risk of death in non-military high-risk occupations. For combat 
personnel the incremental risk of death from deployment is 40 percent higher than the risk of 
workplace death in logging, the most hazardous civilian occupation in 2012. 
6.2 Value of a Statistical Life  
It is possible to monetize the economic implications of the increase in deployment-related 
fatal injury risk and, in turn, infer a specific value for DOD to use for supplemental (danger) pay. 
The calculation involves the standard value of statistical life (VSL) estimates from the 
economics literature. Although there are many ways to estimate VSLs, the predominate approach 
is to regress some measure of wage against the probability of a work-related fatal injury, 
controlling for other factors that might also affect wages such as the rate of non-fatal workplace 
																																								 																				
5 Military personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan did not choose the hours they were exposed to risk, unlike 
civilians who face workplace hazards only while working. The entire time deployed, military personnel face a 
higher chance of death. The rates we present per 100,000 military personnel are roughly twice as large as equivalent 
rates per 2,000 hours of risk exposure. The average person in the military deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan spent 5.7 
months in theater or 4,118 hours exposed to risk (24 hours × 7 days × 4.3 weeks per month × 5.7 months), slightly 
more than twice the number of hours of a FTE worker. Because deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan both raised the 
risk of death per hour of exposure and results in more hours exposed to risk as compared to the average civilian 
worker, the appropriate risk comparison is between the incremental risk from deployment per 100,000 military 
personnel and workplace fatalities per 100,000 FTE workers. 
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injury, workers’ compensation benefits, education, race, marital status, and union membership. 
The regression then provides an estimate of the willingness of workers as a group to pay for a 
small reduction in risk, !"
!"
, where w is the wage rate and π is the probability of a workplace 
fatality. For example, suppose that based on estimates of !"
!"
 an average worker is willing to 
sacrifice $900 per year to reduce risk by 1 in 100,000, meaning that a 100,000 workers would 
collectively pay $9 million and one life would be saved. The life saved would not be known 
beforehand, but in a sense, would be drawn randomly; hence, the resulting value is referred to as 





 Economists have found the values for VSL estimates in the $4 million-$10 million range 
(Aldy and Viscusi 2007, 2008; Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, and Ziliak 2012; Kniesner, Leeth, and 
Sullivan 2015; Leeth and Ruser 2003; Rohlfs, Sullivan, and Kniesner 2015; Viscusi and Aldi 
2003; and Viscusi 1993, 2004). Although there has been some work using VSL estimates in 
military settings, there is currently no standard VSL estimate in place within the Department of 
Defense to use on personnel matters (Greenstone, Ryan, and Yankovich 2017; Kniesner, Leeth, 
and Sullivan 2015; Rohlfs and Sullivan 2013; Rohlfs, Sullivan, Treistman, and Deng 2015; 
Rohlfs, Sullivan, and Kniesner 2016).  
Other government agencies generally use a VSL of $8 million-$10 million when 
considering the value of regulations that reduce mortality risk. The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), for instance, recommends using $7.4 million ($2006) updated yearly 
for inflation as the default VSL based on fitting a Weibull distribution to 26 separate VSL 
estimates (U.S. EPA 2010). The $7.6 million represents the central estimate (mean) of the fitted 
distribution. The recommended VSL for 2016 after adjusting for the general rise in prices using 
the Consumer Price Index would be $8.8 million. The Department of Transportation (DOT) in 
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2016 suggested researchers use a slightly higher value of $9.6 million per statistical life in cost-
benefit analysis calculations (U.S. DOT 2016). The DOT value is the average VSL found in nine 
relatively recent labor market studies using CFOI data to determine fatality risk, corrected for 
inflation and the increase in real income over time. Other government agencies have not issued 
general directives on the appropriate VSL to use in cost-benefit analyses, but most appear to base 
their calculations on the recommendations of the EPA or DOT or from a survey of VSL 
estimates such as Viscusi and Aldy (2003) (U.S. Department of Labor 2016 a,b, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security 2016, and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2017). 
 VSLs vary by the risk preferences of the group considered. Less risk averse individuals 
who sort into high-risk occupations such as the military will require less compensation for an 
increase in the chance of death than more risk averse individuals. VSLs used by government 
agencies in cost-benefit analyses are based upon empirical studies that estimate VSLs using data 
drawn from broad national samples of U.S. civilian workers with an average level of fatal injury 
risk considerably smaller than the incremental risk of military personnel deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  
Three studies examining risk compensation within extremely high-risk occupations 
indicate that the VSL for military personnel may be much lower than in the overall civilian 
working population. As shown in Figure 5, commercial fishing is one of the most dangerous 
occupations in the U.S., and commercial fishing in the Alaskan Bering Sea is even more 
dangerous than fishing in general. Lavetti (2017) examines a sample of commercial fishing 
deckhands in the Alaskan Bering Sea who face a fatal injury risk that varies by month from a low 
of 100 per 100,000 FTE workers to a high of 600 per 100,000 FTE workers (Figure 1). At the 
25th percentile of fatal injury risk (120 per 100,000 FTE workers) the VSL for deckhands is $6.7 
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million, but at the 75th percentile of fatal injury risk (410 per 100,000 FTE workers) the VSL is 
only $1.5 million. Felthoven, Horrace, and Schnier (2009) examine a somewhat broader sample 
of Alaskan commercial fishers with a mean fatal injury risk of about 142 per 100,000 FTE 
workers. Their VSL ranges from $4.6 million to $5.5 million depending on the empirical 
specification. Finally, Goucher and Horrace (2012) estimate the VSL of paid guides from 
developed countries who were leading mountain climbing expeditions in the Himalayan 
Mountains of Nepal and India. The mean probability of death for paid guides over the period 
they examine (1987-2007) was 450 per 100,000 and the estimated VSL is in the $4.5 million to 
$6.0 million range.6 
Although the studies of private-sector high-risk occupations just described imply using a 
lower VSL for military personnel, government agencies have not adopted varying VSLs for 
specific subpopulations who may have higher or lower VSLs than the general population. For 
instance, VSLs rise as income rises, yet government agencies such as the EPA and DOT use a 
single VSL to evaluate the benefits of safety regulations regardless of the income of the 
subpopulation affected. To provide calculations that DOD might use in adjusting their danger 
pay for military personnel, we will combine our results with the recommended VSL from DOT. 
6.3 Implications for Military Hazardous Duty Pay 
We have seen that, overall, military personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan face about 
a 48 per 100,000 increase in the chance of death in a given year compared to their stateside 
counterparts. This translates into a compensation value of: $9.6 million × 0.0004795 = $4,603. 
Digging further into the data, we find that military personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 
spent on average 5.7 months in theater out of the year. Therefore, additional monthly 
																																								 																				
6 All values have been converted to $2016 using the CPI. 
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compensation (compensating wage differential) while in theater should equal roughly $4,603/5.7 
= $808 per month. 
 As discussed previously, the current compensation system mainly provides additional 
compensation for personnel deployed into combat zones through the HFP/IDP and CZTE. The 
current system has been shown to benefit officers and personnel who are not the most at risk for 
death (Pleeter et al. 2011). It may therefore be efficient to change the current system toward one 
which provides additional monetary compensation to the military personnel who see the biggest 
change in their probability of death when deployed into a combat zones.  
For example, the most extreme change in fatality rates appears to be those estimates 
associated with military personnel described as in Combat Job types. Our preferred estimates 
(column 4 in Table 4) show that combat personnel who deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan experience 
a 180 per 100,000 increase in the probability of death compared to non-deployed combat 
personnel who stay stateside. This suggests a compensating wage differential equal to $3,032 per 
month for combat type personnel.7 A pay variation across job types may be of considerable 
interest to policy makers if their goal is to more efficiently compensate military personnel based 
on changes in fatality rates while deployed. Although outside the scope of our research here, 
further analysis could be done by breaking down values for all MOS job types across the entire 
Department of Defense. 
The calculations also suggest that a tax credit of $808 per month while being deployed 
into a combat zone would be appropriate for policy makers if their preference is to use a standard 
compensating wage differential for danger pay across all personnel types in DOD. This is in 
contrast to the current status quo of $225 per month in danger pay (and additional tax benefits 
through the CZTE) provided to U.S. military personnel deployed into combat zones.  
																																								 																				
7 $9.6 million × 0.0018 = $17,280. On a per month basis, this is $17,280/5.7 months = $3,032 per month. 
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Using differing compensating wage differentials by job type would benefit some military 
personnel over others. In particular, the combat job types would most dramatically benefit under 
such as system because our estimates suggest they should be receiving a compensating wage 
differential of $3,032 per month while in theater. Some non-combat troop types could see their 
pay cut under such a system given the estimates provided in Table 3. Regardless of the specific 
amount chosen, policymakers could eliminate the current HFP/IDP and CZTE compensation 
system in place of a more straightforward tax credit. This would simplify the compensation 
system as well as more accurately reflect the true compensating wage differential based upon 
actual risk.  
Of note, many of our estimates (such as those for Air Force personnel) suggest that some 
personnel types actually do not see an increase in the probability of death when deployed into 
combat zones. This raises questions about whether personnel should be receiving danger pay at 
all. Instead, personnel who are subject to no greater fatality rise could receive additional 
compensation through the HDP-L. In terms of policy implications, this is what our estimates 
indicate, but such a pay policy is likely to receive extreme pushback from affected groups 
because it is effectively a decrease in their current pay. Policymakers will have to decide the best 
course of action to take given the political and budgetary climate at the time.8 
 Previous studies have found that the CZTE costs the U.S. government roughly 4.5 times 
the amount of the HFP/IDP (Pleeter et al. 2011). Given standard danger pay is equal to $225 per 
month, the CZTE costs roughly 4.5 × $225 = $1,013 per month on average for military personnel 
																																								 																				
8 An extension of our research would include the incidence of and compensation for non-fatal injuries. Due to data 
limitations (a lack of information on stateside non-fatal injuries) we could not examine the effect of combat 
deployment on injuries. Personal discussions with military personnel on the topic indicate mixed feelings on 
whether non-fatal injury values should be included in danger pay. Some held the view that injury compensation 
should be handled strictly through the Veterans Administration’s disability compensation program and that danger 
pay should be allocated solely based on fatality risk.   
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deployed into combat. Therefore, the current compensating wage differential is equal to around 
$225 + $1,013 = $1,238 per month. If policy makers would prefer to keep combat pay 
standardized across job types, then our recommended value of $808 per month in combat pay is 
actually lower than the $1,238 per month policy currently in place. Consequently, enacting a 
$808 per month tax credit for personnel deployed to combat zones in replacement of the current 
pay structure could lead to substantial budgetary savings for the U.S. government.  
Another alternative would be to enact a revenue neutral option. For example, the DOD 
could implement our recommended danger pay value of $808 per month and then use the cost 
savings to increase other types of pay such as bonuses, regular pay, or life insurance payouts. 
Our estimates suggest a value of $808 per month for danger pay would be appropriate if 
policymakers would prefer to keep the pay structure standardized across all military members.9 
A possibly better policy would be to vary the danger pay by service or job type. However, that 
option seems unlikely in the current political environment. Regardless of the course of action 
taken, the current pay structure appears to be outdated and needs updating to more accurately 
reflect the efficient compensation by risk level across military personnel. 
7. Conclusion 
 
The research presented here uses restricted data from the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) and Social Security Administration (SSA) to examine the demographics of 
																																								 																				
9 Our recommendation is in line with other research on the topic (Simon et al. 2011; Department of Defense 2012). 
The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) states “The QRMC concludes that replacing the 
CZTE with a refundable Combat Tax Credit would equalize the benefit for all members. Based on the period during 
which the member received HFP, a credit would also eliminate factors such as family income and size from 
calculation of the combat tax exclusion. A tax credit is independent of tax bracket and, like all tax credits, would be 
applied after an individual’s tax liability is computed. By making this a refundable tax credit, junior members who 
have little or no tax liability would receive the full amount of the credit as a refund. A tax credit would also 
eliminate the current practice of high-income members using the tax exclusion to qualify for the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. Unlike the current tax exclusion, a tax credit would also be easier for members to understand and quantify.” 
The Quadrennial Review further notes that “a refundable tax credit of $850 per month could replace current policy 
at no additional cost.” 
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U.S. military combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and deployment’s effect on 
casualties. As a primary identification strategy we use stateside service members as a control 
group in comparison to the treatment group of Active Duty service members deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan. We also present estimates of the appropriate level of danger pay for deployed 
military personnel. 
Point estimates presented suggest that, in general, U.S. military personnel who deployed 
in an individual year to Iraq or Afghanistan experienced about a 48 per 100,000 increase in the 
probability of death in a given year in comparison to non-deployed military personnel who 
stayed stateside. This translates into a $808 per month compensating wage differential when 
standard VSL values are applied from the economics literature. This is in comparison to the 
current situation of $225 per month in danger pay and additional tax benefits through the CZTE 
provided to U.S. military personnel deployed into combat zones. We also show that there is 
considerable variation in fatality risk when deployed across different job types and services. Our 
estimates therefore suggest that the standard values for danger pay used by DOD should more 
properly be adjusted by service or job type. 
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Figure 1: Total number of Deaths and Boots on the Ground for U.S. Troops  
in Iraq and Afghanistan by Year 
         	
	
	
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Notes: Data for the graphs taken from Icasualties.org 2018a, Icasualties.org 2018b, and 
U.S. Congressional Research Service (2014). Exact numbers for boots on the ground 
were not available for Afghanistan in 2001. Therefore, we use January 2002 totals for 
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Notes: Data for the figures are taken from SSA and DMDC records for the years 2001-2012. 
National Guard, Reserve troops, and those observations with missing characteristics are omitted 
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Figure 3: U.S. Active Duty Deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan by Service and Job Type 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
         
Notes: Data for the figures are taken from SSA and DMDC records for the years 2001-2012. National 
Guard, Reserve troops, and observations with missing characteristics are omitted from the totals. 
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Figure 4: Unintentional-Injury-Related Deaths in the U.S., 2001-2012 
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Figure 5: U.S. Civilian Occupations with High Fatal Injury Rates, 2012 
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Notes: Data are taken from SSA and DMDC records for the years 2001-2012. National Guard, 
Reserve troops, and observations with missing characteristics are omitted from the totals. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Death 17,326,043 0.000854 0.0292100 0 1 
Combat Death 17,326,043 0.000272 0.0164995 0 1 
Combat Injury 17,326,043 0.001628 0.0403200 0 1 
Deployed 17,326,043 0.138231 0.3451428 0 1 
      Married 17,326,043 0.505322 0.499970 0 1 
Number of Dependents 16,747,722 1.294570 1.510437 0 26 
AFQT Percentile 13,929,465 60.69650 18.43442 1 98 
Officer 17,323,097 0.158826 0.365514 0 1 
Age 17,320,379 28.75695 7.954840 16 94 
      Female 17,323,097 0.150238 0.35730 0 1 
Hispanic 16,425,298 0.102641 0.30349 0 1 
Asian 16,425,298 0.032641 0.17769 0 1 
Other Ethnicity 16,425,298 0.86472 0.34202 0 1 
Black 16,064,759 0.190855 0.39298 0 1 
White 16,064,759 0.754708 0.43026 0 1 
Other Race 16,064,759 0.054436 0.22688 0 1 
      Army 17,326,043 0.354808 0.478455 0 1 
Marines 17,326,043 0.136734 0.343566 0 1 
Navy 17,326,043 0.248459 0.432120 0 1 
Air Force 17,326,043 0.222832 0.416146 0 1 
      Less than High School 16,878,831 0.055496 0.228945 0 1 
High School 16,878,831 0.684124 0.464864 0 1 
Some College 16,878,831 0.083102 0.276040 0 1 
College (4 year degree) 16,878,831 0.114015 0.317829 0 1 
Beyond College 16,878,831 0.063264 0.243470 0 1 
      Service Job 17,325,219 0.248943 0.43240 0 1 
Combat Job 17,325,219 0.109942 0.31282 0 1 
Support Job 17,325,219 0.113070 0.31668 0 1 
Other Job Type 17,325,219 0.528784 0.49917 0 1 
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Table 2: The Effect of Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan on Death 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Deployment .0009649*** 0.0007624*** 0.0004763*** 0.0004795*** 
 
(7.1e-05) (7.26e-05) (5.66e-05) (6.45e-05) 
     Control Variables? No Yes No Yes 
Unit and Time Fixed Effects? No No Yes Yes 
     Observations 16,682,084 11,702,415 16,682,084 11,702,415 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Standard errors are clustered at the unit (battalion) level. Control variables include 
married, number of dependents, AFQT percentile, officer, age, gender, race, ethnicity,  
education, and job type. Time and unit fixed effects include year and battalion dummy variables.  
The linear probability model shown in the table has the primary outcome variable  
(Fatalityit) = 1 if service member i is killed in year t and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
